We provide a simple learning process that enables an agent to forecast a sequence of outcomes. Our forecasting scheme, termed tracking forecast, is based on tracking the past observations while emphasizing recent outcomes. As opposed to other forecasting schemes, we sacrifice universality in favor of a significantly reduced memory requirements. We show that if the sequence of outcomes has certain properties-it has some internal (hidden) state that does not change too rapidly-then the tracking forecast is weakly calibrated so that the forecast appears to be correct most of the time. For binary outcomes, this result holds without any internal state assumptions. We consider learning in a repeated strategic game where each player attempts to compute some forecast of the opponent actions and play a best response to it. We show that if one of the players uses a tracking forecast, while the other player uses a standard learning algorithm (such as exponential regret matching or smooth fictitious play), then the player using the tracking forecast obtains the best response to the actual play of the other players. We further show that if both players use tracking forecast, then under certain conditions on the game matrix, convergence to a Nash equilibrium is possible with positive probability for a larger class of games than the class of games for which smooth fictitious play converges to a Nash equilibrium.
equilibrium is possible with positive probability for a larger class of games than thethe grid must be gradually (and slowly) refined. Moreover, with the exception of the elegant forecasting rule for binary sequences of Fudenberg and Levine (1999) , the computational burden for every step of existing forecasting algorithms is significant. As a result, current calibrated forecasting algorithms cannot be considered for operation on-line. Another drawback of calibrated forecasts is the lack of convergence rates. We do not address convergence rates in this work.
Motivated by the importance of calibration in prediction problems and in learning in games, we explore the possibility of calibration without discretization. We introduce a "tracking forecast" that sacrifices universality in favor of a significantly reduced computational burden. Specifically, the tracking forecast has the same computational requirement as computing empirical frequencies. We show that the tracking forecast is calibrated for special classes of sequences, and we discuss some consequences of tracking forecasts in repeated matrix games.
Outline of the paper
The setup of the prediction problem and some relevant literature review is provided in Section 2. We recall the formal definition of calibrated forecasts and a relaxation of it called weakly calibrated forecasts (following (Kakade & Foster, 2004) ). This sense of calibration is more natural in the context of our analysis as it involves smooth test functions instead of indicators.
This paper has two main contributions. We first discuss calibrated forecasting in isolation, while assuming that an agent tries to forecast a given sequence. We then use the developed results to consider learning in games where the multiple players use tracking forecasts (or other algorithms) to predict each other's moves.
In Section 3 we present and analyze the tracking forecast algorithm. This algorithm has the same computational burden as computing empirical frequencies, and essentially forecasts the outcomes to have the same distribution as a weighted mean of recent observations. We show that if the outcome sequence is generated by a (hidden) state process that does not change too rapidly, then the tracking forecast is weakly calibrated. The case of binary outcomes receives a special treatment as it turns out that for this case, no assumptions on the sequence are needed. Finally we outline a simple method to "produce" a calibrated scheme (as opposed to weakly calibrated) from a weakly calibrated tracking scheme. This can be done by adding a small random perturbation to the forecast.
In Section 4 we consider learning in repeated games. We show that if one of the players uses a best response strategy against the forecasted action of the other, and if the other agent uses some "slow algorithm" like regret matching, gradient play, or smooth fictitious play, the player using tracking forecast will play a best response against the actual moves of the second player. We further consider the case of self-play, where both players use a best response to a combination of tracking forecasts and empirical frequencies. We show that in this case, convergence to a Nash equilibrium is enabled in a larger class of games than standard smooth fictitious play. Numerical simulations that illustrate convergence and divergence issues are presented in Section 5.
The analysis of the results presented in this paper relies on the stochastic approximation algorithm. The main idea is to study the convergence of a discrete time stochastic iteration using the stability of an associated ODE (ordinary differential equation). This approach is not new to machine learning-it was used to prove the convergence of reinforcement learning algorithms (Tsitsiklis, 1994) as well as to analyze certain learning in games framework (Benaim, Hofbauer, & Sorin, 2003; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998) . However, since it is not a mainstream technique in machine learning, we provide some discussion and required results in Appendix A.
Notation:
We will use the following notations throughout the paper. -For a square matrix, M denotes the matrix norm:
|M x| |x| .
-Boldface 1 denotes the vector
denotes the n − 1 dimensional simplex in R n :
= {s ∈ R n : s ≥ 0, componentwise, and 1 T s = 1}. -σ : R n → denotes the "logit" or "soft-max" function (σ (x)) i = e
For notational simplicity, we will not write explicitly the underlying dimension in R n of 1, , or vert[ ].
Calibrated forecasts
In this section we review the concept of calibration. We start from the basic setup in Section 2.1. We then recall the classical definition of (strong) calibration in Section 2.2. Finally we present a relaxed version of calibration, termed weak calibration, in Section 2.3.
Online prediction set-up
At every stage, k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., there is an outcome, x(k), that belongs to a finite set, X , with n elements. We will associate X with the set of vertices of the simplex, so that
A forecaster observes outcomes sequentially, and at stage k, makes a forecast, f (k) ∈ , of the current outcome based on previously observed outcomes, {x(0), x(1), . . . , x(k − 1)}. Note that the forecast, f (k), may belong to the entire simplex, , i.e., not just a vertex. Accordingly, we interpret the ith element of f (k) as the forecasted probability that the ith element of X will occur at stage k. In general, we allow for the possibility of randomized forecasts, where f (k) is a non-deterministic function of the observed outcomes.
Calibration
We now define criteria under which a forecasting scheme is considered to be "calibrated". The discussion follows that of Kakade and Foster (2004) .
For any p ∈ and δ > 0, define the indicator function
This function indicates whether a forecast, f , is within a specified tolerance of a specified point in the simplex. Now, define the calibration error of a sequence x with respect to an indicator function, I p,δ , as
The calibration error with respect to I p,δ compares the predicted frequency with the actual realized frequency when the prediction is δ close to p.
Definition 2.1. A forecasting scheme is ε-calibrated if for all outcome sequences,
and all indicator functions, I p,δ , the calibration error satisfies lim sup
almost surely.
The statement "almost surely" in the definition refers to the set of realizations of randomization during forecasting. Note that a probabilistic structure has not been imposed on the space of outcome sequences. A sequence is called calibrated if it is ε-calibrated for every ε > 0. Prior work (Dawid, 1985; Oakes, 1985) has shown that there does not exist a deterministic forecasting scheme that satisfies the calibration criterion for all outcome sequences, and so randomized forecasting is necessary.
The standard intuition behind the calibration criterion is as follows. Define
and let n(K , p, δ, x) denote the number of elements of N (K , p, δ, x). In words, n(K , p, δ, x) denotes the number of times the forecast, f (k), approximately equaled the specified value, p, between time 0 to time K , and the set N (K , p, δ, x) denotes the set of stages where this occurred. The calibration error can be rewritten as (K , p,δ,x) x(k) − p .
(The ≈ sign is due to the fact that the forecast f may be slightly different than p on N (K , p, δ, x).) We see that there are two ways for the calibration error to vanish. First, the forecasted value of p may be rarely used in that lim sup
If this is not the case, then we require that for large K ,
implying that the empirical frequency of the outcomes over the stages where the forecast was (approximately) p is consistent with the forecast of p.
Weak calibration
Following (Kakade & Foster, 2004) , we now state a relaxed version of calibration called "weak" 1 calibration. Let W denote the set of Lipschitz continuous functions w : → R + . Now define the calibration error with respect to a test function, w ∈ W, as
This is the same form as the previously defined calibration error, but with the indicator function, I p,δ (·), now replaced by the test function, w(·). Note that indicator functions are excluded from being test functions because they fail the Lipschitz continuity requirement. It is convenient to think of the test functions as "bump" functions that are smoothed versions of indicator functions.
Definition 2.2.
A forecasting scheme is weakly calibrated if for all outcome sequences, x = {x(0), x(1), x(2), . . .}, and all test functions, w ∈ W, the calibration error satisfies lim sup
As before, randomized forecasts are allowed. However, unlike the case of strong calibration, it is possible to derive a deterministic forecasting scheme (Kakade & Foster, 2004) that is weakly calibrated for all outcome sequences, and so randomization is no longer necessary. Reference (Kakade & Foster, 2004 ) goes on to show how to use randomization in conjunction with a weakly calibrated forecast to achieve strong calibration. (See the forthcoming Section 3.6.) We will suppress the x henceforth to reduce notational clutter.
Calibration with bounded memory
In this section we present and analyze our forecasting algorithm. We start by discussing the complexity of existing calibration schemes in Section 3.1. We then focus the attention on a restricted class of sources for which weak calibration will be possible using a "simple" scheme in Section 3.2. We present the forecasting algorithm in Section 3.3, and proofs that it is calibrated for certain sources in Section 3.4. We provide a three letter example where tracking forecast is not weakly calibrated in Section 3.5. We finally show a simple procedure that achieves strong calibration in Section 3.6.
The complexity of calibration
Randomized forecasting schemes that achieve calibration are presented in Foster and Vohra (1998) , Fudenberg and Levine (1999) and Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) , and a deterministic forecasting scheme that achieves weak calibration is presented in Kakade and Foster (2004) . Generalizations of calibration are discussed in Sandroni, Smorodinsky, and Vohra (2003) and references therein.
In general, all existing algorithms may be written in a state-space form
for suitably defined (possibly randomized) functions, G(·) and H (·), where z is some "state space" variable representing the memory needed from one period to the other. The dimension of the state-space variable, z(k), constitutes a minimum memory requirement, and hence gives an indication of the complexity, to execute these algorithms. The algorithms presented in the above works are "universal" in that the calibration criterion is satisfied for all outcome sequences. This universality apparently has a significant cost in terms of memory requirements. Namely, achieving calibration for any fixed set, X , requires an ever increasing memory. Some of the above works present versions that achieve ε-calibration. In all of these works, the memory requirements of z(k) typically are associated with a node of a discretization of the simplex where the amount of memory required is O(1/ε n ), where n is the number of possible outcomes. Satisfying the calibration criterion (rather than ε calibration) is achieved through a slow progressive refinement of this discretization. Accordingly, the dimension of z(k) increases without bound. We will not review the specifics of these algorithms here, but it is worth emphasizing that the tracking forecast presented below requires memory that is linear in n, and independent of ε.
Classes of outcome sequences
Our objective is to explore a trade-off between universality and complexity. In particular, we will consider calibration of special classes of outcome sequences. This will be achieved with a forecasting scheme, called tracking forecast, that has the same computational and memory requirements as computing running averages or empirical frequencies. Hence, these forecasts are easily computed online. The price of the complexity reduction is that the forecasting scheme is no longer universal.
Let O denote a class of outcome sequences, i.e., a subset of the space of X -valued infinite sequences.
Definition 3.1. A forecasting scheme is ε-calibrated over the set O if the calibration criterion (2) is satisfied for the set of outcome sequences
Similarly, a forecasting scheme is weakly calibrated over the set O if the weak calibration condition (4) is satisfied for all outcome sequences belonging to O.
The following sequence classes will be of particular interest.
Bounded rate sequences: Any sequence generated by the following recursion:
d is a uniformly bounded random sequence with
for any calibration error function e w .
Bounded rate sequences have their own "internal" state space dynamics (the X (k)). These dynamics can depend on random fluctuations (via M(k) ), on the previous state, and on the forecasting itself (F can take f (k) as an argument). The probability p(k) that dictates the selection of the sequence x(k) depends on that state space (and also on the forecast f , but in a weak way). The crucial requirement is that X (k) cannot change too fast. As a result, p(k) cannot change too rapidly as well. It is worth noting that when we assume that the sequence has bounded rate, we will never assume that the forecaster has access to the specifications of the sequence. In particular, F and h are assumed unknown.
Many algorithms for playing a repeated game generate bounded rate sequences. We mention several such algorithms in Section 4.1.2.
Relatively bounded rate sequences: Any sequence generated by the same recursion above and under the same assumptions, except that a(k) = 1/(k + 1) η for some 1/2 < η < 1.
In a relatively bounded sequence, the state variable can move a bit faster. Still, the rate of change to the state variable X (k) and consequently to the probability governing the sequence p(k) is slow.
Binary sequences: Any sequence over a binary outcome space, i.e., n = 2.
For binary sequences, we do not require any particular structure.
Tracking forecasts
The tracking forecast (Foster, 2005) is defined by
where 0 < ρ < 1.
For ρ = 1, this becomes the same as the online computation of a running average, or empirical frequencies, i.e.,
or, equivalently,
In terms of the previous discussion on calibration complexity, we see that the memory requirement of the tracking forecast is fixed to be the number of elements, n, of the outcome space. No discretization of the simplex is required. Our main result states that the tracking forecast is in fact calibrated over the above sequences.
Theorem 3.1. The tracking forecast is weakly calibrated over the following classes of sequences:
1. Bounded rate sequences for any 1/2 < ρ < 1; 2. Relatively bounded rate sequences for any 1/2 < ρ < η < 1; 3. Binary sequences for any 0 < ρ < 1.
As a consequence of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in the case of bounded rate and relatively bounded rate sequences, we will see that the tracking forecasts actually satisfy a much more stringent condition than weak calibration. Namely, if the outcome sequence is generated according to
In other words, the tracking forecast converges to the actual stage-by-stage probability distribution that generates the outcome sequence. This consequence reflects an additional benefit from sacrificing universality, and it will have an important implication for learning in games (see Theorem 4.1).
Proofs for Theorem 3.1
The proof of each of the statements in Theorem 3.1 first casts the system as a stochastic approximation algorithm. The general iteration of the stochastic approximation algorithm is:
where a(k) is a decreasing learning rate, F is some Lipschitz function and M(k) is typically a random noise. Under certain conditions, Y (k) converges to y * , where y * is an equilibrium point 2 of the ODE y . = F(y). Appendix A contains a more precise statement of the results needed here. After casting the relevant system as a stochastic approximation algorithm, each proof contains specialized analysis that is usually concerned with proving that the ODE is stable.
Bounded rate sequences
We will write the combined equations for a bounded rate sequence (5), tracking forecast (6), and calibration error (3), in such a way to apply the ODE method of stochastic approximation presented in Appendix A. In particular, the form of these equations will satisfy the "two time scale stochastic approximation" setup of Proposition A.2. In two time scale stochastic approximation, there are two iterations on different time scales. The analysis of the fast iteration assumes that the variables which are modified by the slow iteration are fixed, while the slow iteration assumes that the variables modified by the fast iteration reach their equilibrium points.
2 An ODE y . = F(y) has an equilibrium y * if F(y * ) = 0, so that the constant function y(t) ≡ y * is a solution of the ODE.
Step 1: Casting as a stochastic approximation problem. By writing the calibration error (3) in a recursive form, the overall discrete time iterations are
we can rewrite these equations as
and
These satisfy
Also, by assumption,
and so the resulting equations fall under the framework of Proposition A.2.
Step 2: Analysis of the fast time scale. After showing that the two time scale framework holds for this problem, we set out to analyze the possible solutions of the ODE. We start with the "fast" iteration that considers the tracking forecast.
wherex is fixed. We will show that for anyx, the differential Eq. (10) has a unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium 3 f * = φ(x) for some Lipschitz continuous function φ(·).
By assumption, for anyx,
which implies that f → h(x, f ) is a contraction (e.g., (Khalil, 2001 , Lemma 3.1)). That is, for any f 1 and f 2 ,
with γ < 1. According to the contraction mapping theorem (e.g., (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1989 , Section 3.1)), for anyx, the equation
has a unique solution, f * , which we can write as
The Lipschitz assumption on h assures that φ is also Lipschitz continuous. To see this, consider
and so
3 An equilibrium y * of the ODE y . = F(y) is called a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium, if for any initial condition y(0) the solution of the ODE, y(t), satisfies that |y(t) − y * | → 0 as t → ∞ and if for every > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that if y(t) is a solution to the ODE satisfying |y(0) − y * | < δ then |y(t) − y * | < for all t ≥ 0.
Since γ < 1, this implies that
which shows that φ is Lipschitz continuous. To show that φ(x) is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium of (10), consider the Lyapunov function candidate
Along solutions of (10),
Standard methods from nonlinear systems analysis (e.g., (Khalil, 2001) ) establish that V ( f (t)) decreases exponentially and that φ(x) is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Step 3: Analysis of the slow time scale. Following Proposition A.2, we now consider the differential equation
we have that e . w (t) = −e w (t), and so the set
is a global asymptotically stable attractor.
4
With all of the conditions of Proposition A.2 are satisfied, we can conclude that lim k→∞ e w (k) = 0 almost surely. It is worth emphasizing that the proof holds for every test function w.
Note that Proposition A.2 further implies that
then we can also conclude the convergence stated in (8).
Relatively bounded rate sequences
The proof for relatively bounded rate sequences progresses similarly to bounded rate sequences. We first write the discrete time iterations similarly to the iterations (9).
with 1/2 < ρ < η < 1. The same arguments used previously for bounded rate sequences when applied to the above iterations establish that lim k→∞ẽw (k) = 0 almost surely. The definition of calibration requires, however, that lim k→∞ e w (k) = 0 almost surely, where
4 An ODE y . = F(y) has a stable attractor Z, if for any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0, such that inf z∈Z |y(0) − z| < δ implies that inf z∈Z |y(t) − z| < ε, for all t ≥ 0. A stable attractor, Z, is globally asymptotically stable if furthermore, for any initial conditions, the solution of the ODE satisfies that inf z∈Z |y(t) − z| → 0.
We now proceed to prove that lim k→∞ẽw (k) = 0 implies that lim k→∞ e w (k) = 0. The following technical lemma is the well known Kronecker lemma (e.g., (Durrett, 1991) ).
Lemma 3.1 (Kronecker). Let s(k) be a sequence of real numbers and S(k)
we have that
converges to a finite limit. By Kronecker's lemma,
converges to zero. Consequentially, the running average
also converges to zero. Sinceẽ w (k) → 0 almost surely, we have that the average
almost surely. But this average is the calibration error, e w (K ), which completes the proof.
Binary sequences
Unlike the previous proofs, we will not assume a model of how the outcome sequence is being generated. Instead, we will take advantage of the redundancy in the binary case and the fact the dynamics of the forecast and the calibration error are essentially scalar. The proof is based on stochastic approximation convergence results presented in Appendix A.
The discrete time iterations for the calibration error of a specific test function, w ∈ W, and the tracking forecast are
By definition, the components of both x(k) and f (k) sum to unity, i.e., 1
There are several consequences of this constraint in the binary case:
-We need only show that the first component of e w (k) converges to zero to establish weak calibration. This is because sum of the components of e w (k) will equal zero by Definition 3. -We can write f (k) in terms of its first component only, i.e.,
.
-The test function w( f (k)) is really a function of a scalar quantity, i.e.,
Temporary notation: In the rest of the proof, we will consider only the first component of e w (k), the first component of f (k), and the scalar domain view of w( f (k)). In order to avoid cumbersome notation, we will not make this explicit. We can write the equation for the tracking forecast as
Substituting this into the equation for the calibration error results in
If we can show that the product of a(k) and M(k), defined above, satisfies the KushnerClark condition (25), then the resulting differential equation in stochastic approximation will be e . w (t) = −e w (t). Therefore, the discrete iterations for e w (k) converge to zero.
Towards this end, let us inspect
Given any test function, w ∈ W, define v :
Since w is Lipschitz continuous, and since v(
which in turn implies that
Substituting v in place of w in (11) and using (12) we obtain
The second term (13b) is absolutely summable since
by definition. Therefore, this term satisfies the Kushner-Clark condition (25).
An application of Lemma A.1 establishes that the first term (13a) also satisfies the Kushner-Clark condition. A similar analysis holds for the reverse inequality (replacing the + with − in (13b)).
Finally, Proposition A.1 implies that the calibration error, e w (k), converges to zero. Note that we used deterministic arguments to establish the Kushner-Clark condition, and so we have a deterministic guarantee of convergence (as opposed to "almost surely").
Non binary sequences
In this section we show that the fact that tracking forecast is calibrated for binary alphabet cannot be extended to richer alphabets. Specifically, we show using a counterexample that tracking forecast is not calibrated for a trinary alphabet prediction problem. We use a somewhat informal language in this example since an exact argument would be tedious. Our example is similar to the Shapley polygon (Shapley, 1964) .
Consider a three letter sequence where a tracking forecast is used with some 0 < ρ ≤ 1. We will construct a policy for Nature that guarantees that the tracking forecast is not weakly calibrated. For a visual interpretation of the example, see Fig. 1 . Suppose that in this example the following values are given to points in the simplex: A = (4/7, 1/7, 2/7), B = (2/7, 4/7, 1/7), and C = (1/7, 2/7, 4/7).
Nature's strategy is to start by following A for a long time. By following we mean that either Nature randomizes between the three letters as prescribed by A or that Nature uses some deterministic time sharing policy so that the empirical frequency is approximately A. In either case, up to small fluctuations (which we will ignore), we assume that the tracking forecast is A after sufficiently long time (we will denote this time by k 0 ). We will write this as f (k) ≈ A and take it to mean that up to some small > 0 we have that | f (k) − A| < . Now, Nature starts playing e 2 repeatedly. We claim that after sufficiently long time, k B , the tracking forecast is f (k B ) ≈ B. Indeed, B is on the segment between A and e 2 so that after observing the second letter once we have that
ρ e 2 which is on the segment between A and e 2 . As Nature repeatedly plays action 2, f (k) will traverse the segment between A and e 2 . We can therefore find k B such that (Ak 0 + e 2 (k B − k 0 ))/k B ≈ B. Note that the exact value of k B depends on ρ. When the tracking forecast reaches B, that is f (k B ) ≈ B, Nature switches to playing e 3 . After a long enough time, k C , we have that f (k c ) ≈ C (again, this is because C is on the segment between B and e 3 ). Now, Nature switches to playing e 1 until time k A where f (k A ) ≈ A. It follows that from time k to k B the observation has empirical frequency of e 2 while the tracking forecast prediction ranges from A to B. Similarly, from time k B until k C the actual empirical frequency is e 3 while the forecast is between B to C. Finally, from time k C to k A the actual empirical frequency is e 1 while the tracking forecast is between C and A. Nature can now repeat the strategy again by using e 1 followed by e 2 followed by e 3 in a similar way to before. This process can proceed ad-infinitum.
In terms of weak calibration as defined in Eq. (3), we can take three smooth testing rules: a smoothed one for each of the segments AB, BC, C A (a smoothed inflated indicator, to account for errors due to finite samples). It is easy to verify that the tracking forecast is not weakly calibrated.
Randomized tracking forecasts and strong calibration
In this section we outline a method to obtain a strongly calibrated forecast based on tracking forecast. Kakade and Foster (2004) show how to use randomization in conjunction with a weakly calibrated forecast to achieve calibration. Since their calibration approach is based on a fine discretization of the simplex, their randomization is based on rounding to vertices of the discretization of the simplex. In contrast, our approach is based on tracking forecast and would therefore be calibrated only for a restricted classes of sequences. In order to convert weak to strong calibration, we add some small additive noise and show that while this adversely affects the accuracy of the weak calibration, it allows us to obtain strong calibration.
The randomized tracking forecast,f (k), is defined as
where -f (k) is the usual tracking forecast (6).
-h(k) is an independent and identically distributed random vector with uniformly distributed elements over an interval [−h,h], for someh > 0.
The projection operator, assures that the randomized tracking forecast lies in the simplex. Now recall the calibration error with respect to an indicator function, I p,δ , defined in (1), applied to the randomized tracking forecast. The calibration error can be written in the recursive form,
where the expectation is taken over h. We can now rewrite
where
By construction,
Furthermore,
for some constant, C, that does not depend on the outcome sequence or indicator function. It is clear from (15) that if the tracking forecast, f , is weakly calibrated, then the randomized tracking forecast,f , will be ε-calibrated for ε = Ch -provided that the function w is Lipschitz continuous. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of randomization on an indicator function. Let
where h is a uniformly distributed random variable over the interval [−h,h] . Then, assuming thath < δ,
which is Lipschitz continuous. The procedure we outlined above is general, and would lead to an ε-calibrated forecast as long as the tracking forecast is weakly calibrated. We therefore have the following corollary whose proof is a combination of Theorem 3.1 and the above argument.
Corollary 3.1. By choosingh small enough, the randomized tracking forecast (14) is ε-calibrated over the following classes of sequences:
Opponent forecasting in repeated games
There is a substantial body of literature on the topic of learning in games and the related topic of evolutionary games. This includes several recent monographs (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Samuelson, 1997; Young, 1998 Young, , 2004 Weibull, 1995) . At issue in much of this work is understanding the limiting behavior of interacting players that adapt their strategies given incomplete information. One approach to learning in games is to have each player compute some sort of forecast of opponent actions and play a best response to this forecast. Accordingly, the limiting behavior of player actions strongly depends on the specific method for forecasting. For example, in "fictitious play", forecasts are simply the empirical frequencies of opponents actions. In special classes of games, player strategies converge to a Nash equilibrium, but in general, the limiting behavior need not exhibit convergence.
Placing more stringent requirements on the forecasts can result in stronger convergence properties for general games. In particular, if players use calibrated forecasts (Foster & Vohra, 1997) , then player strategies asymptotically converge to the set of correlated equilibria. When players use calibrated forecasts of joint actions, then player strategies converge to the convex hull of Nash equilibria (Kakade & Foster, 2004) .
The computational burden of existing universal calibration algorithms effectively prohibits the implementation of such calibration based methods. In the following sections, we explore the use of tracking forecasts in learning in games.
Learning in repeated games
This section outlines our framework and notation for learning in games. Relevant references are Hart (2005) , Young (2004) , and Fudenberg and Levine (1998) . We start with defining the game setup in our notation in Section 4.1.1 We continue by showing how several popular learning schemes can be unified within the notations in Section 4.1.2. We continue with the case where one of the players uses a tracking forecast, while the other uses one of the standard "slow" algorithms in Section 4.2. We show that the fast player obtains the best response against the slow player's actual play. We finally consider the case where the players play equally fast in Section 4.3. We show that by playing best response with calibrated forecast in a certain way, we can obtain convergence to a Nash equilibrium under certain conditions on the reward matrix.
Static games
We consider a two player game in strategic form with players P 1 and P 2 . For convenience, we assume each player has m moves. A strategy for player P i , is p i ∈ . The standard interpretation is that p i represents probabilistic (mixed) strategies. Each player selects an integer action a i ∈ vert[ ] according to the probability distribution p i , i.e.,
The reward to player P i when P i selects action a i and P −i chooses a −i (we adopt the notation that −i denotes the "other" player) is
which is characterized by the matrix M i and parameter τ ≥ 0. The reward to player P i is the element of M i corresponding to the a th i row and a th −i column, plus the weighted entropy of her strategy. We add the parameterized penalty term, τ H( p i ), to the reward to allow consideration of several different algorithms.
For a given strategy pair, ( p 1 , p 2 ), the expected rewards are
Define the best response mappings,
For τ > 0, the best response turns out to be the logit or soft-max function (see Notation section)
For τ = 0, the best response amounts to selecting a maximizing simplex vertex, which need not be unique. A Nash equilibrium is a pair ( p * 1 , p * 2 ) ∈ × such that for all p i ∈ ,
i.e., each player has no incentive to deviate from an equilibrium strategy provided that the other player maintains an equilibrium strategy. In terms of the best response mappings, a Nash equilibrium is a pair ( p * 1 , p * 2 ) such that
Repeated games
Suppose now that the game is sequentially repeated over stages k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At each stage, k, player P i uses her current strategy, p i (k), to generate her current action,
, according to her utility function evaluated on the total current action profile. Player strategies, p i (k), are updated, or adapted, at each stage according to the information available to player P i over times {0, . . . , k − 1}. We assume that after each stage k, player P i can observe the actions, a −i (k), of the other player.
The following are well known approaches to updating player strategies. The sequence of actions of each of the algorithms is a bounded rate sequence. In each of these methods, players compute the empirical frequencies (as in Eq. (7) of their actions) according to
Smooth fictitious play: Players compute a smoothed (τ > 0) best response to the empirical frequencies of their opponent's actions. Player P i plays according to:
Gradient play: Players update their strategies according to the evolving gradient of the non-smoothed (τ = 0) utility. Player P i plays according to:
The terminology stems from the gradient equation (for τ = 0)
Exponential regret matching: Players accumulate retrospective "regrets", r i (k), of past actions and update their strategies to reduce regret. Player P i plays according to:
Slower opponents
One way to view either smooth fictitious play or gradient play is in terms of an opponent model. The following reflects the perspective of player P 1 modeling player P 2 :
Suppose our opponent, P 2 , uses a stationary strategy, i.e.,
Then, by the law of large numbers, the empirical frequencies of P 2 will converge so that q 2 (k) → s * . This, in turn, implies that our strategy, p 1 (k), will asymptotically approach to the best response to our opponent's strategy, i.e.,
This perspective has a strong connection to the notion of calibration over a class of outcome sequences. Namely, empirical frequencies constitute a calibrated forecast for the class of outcome sequences generated by stationary strategies.
We now introduce a modification of smooth fictitious play in which a player uses a tracking forecast in lieu of empirical frequencies.
Smooth fictitious play with tracking forecasts:
Player P i plays according to:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose Player P 1 plays according to tracking forecast smooth fictitious play (19) with 1/2 < ρ < 1. If the outcome sequence generated by player P 2 is a: -Bounded rate sequence, or -Relatively bounded rate sequence, with ρ < η < 1, then, almost surely,
which implies that
Proof: The proof follows from the same arguments used in Theorem 3.1 for bounded rate and relatively bounded rate sequences.
In terms of the previous discussion on opponent modeling, the use of tracking forecasts can be viewed as a broader class under which a player's strategy approximates the stage-by-stage best response. 
Equally fast opponents and convergence to nash equilibrium
In the previous section, player P 1 had a sort of strategic advantage in playing a best response to a weakly calibrated forecast. We now consider both players using tracking forecasts.
The focus in this section is shifted away from forecasting and redirected to the issue of convergence to Nash equilibrium. Indeed, if both players are using a tracking player, then neither player's forecast is guaranteed to be weakly calibrated (except in 2-move games).
In particular, we will consider how one may overcome non-convergence properties that are exhibited by a broad class of strategy update mechanisms. Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) construct a game such that if players use strategies that are functions of the current value of the empirical frequencies, then convergence to a (mixed) Nash equilibrium cannot occur. The result strongly relies on utility functions not being shared among players. This non-convergence result is reminiscent of earlier results, such as Crawford (1985) , that established non-convergence for certain special classes of strategy update mechanisms.
5
Recent work (Arslan & Shamma, 2004; Shamma & Arslan, 2005) showed that it is possible to overcome this lack of convergence by processing the empirical frequencies in a "dynamic" manner, i.e., by allowing strategies to depend on the evolution of the empirical frequencies, and not just their current values. This is achieved by introducing auxiliary variables, upon which to base strategy adaptation. Related work is Hart and Mas-Colell (2004) , which also investigates the potential benefit of introducing increased memory to enable converge to Nash equilibria.
Conditions for non-convergence in smooth fictitious play
The method of stochastic approximation can be used to deduce the lack of convergence to a Nash equilibrium (see Theorem 5.1 in Benaim & Hirsch (1999) ). When both players use smooth fictitious play as in Eqs. (17)- (18), the asymptotic behavior of the discrete-time iterations may be analyzed by the differential equations
Let (q * 1 , q * 2 ) be a Nash equilibrium, which, by definition, will be an equilibrium point of (20). The local asymptotic stability of (20) may be assessed by examining the eigenvalues of the appropriate Jacobian matrix. Linearizing the right hand side of (20) at the equilibrium (q * 1 , q * 2 ) results in
However, this Jacobian matrix does not reflect that the q i (t) are constrained to evolve on the simplex. We can write any q i (t) ∈ as
The elements of both q i (t) and q * i sum to unity, therefore the elements of δq i (t) must sum to zero. Equivalently,
for someq i (t), where N an m × (m − 1) matrix (recall that m is the number of moves for each player) such that
The appropriate reduced order Jacobian matrix is in fact
which reflects the dynamics being written in terms of theq i . A more detailed discussion may be found in Shamma and Arslan (2005, Eqs . (9)- (12)).
The following is an adaptation of Theorem 5.1 in Benaim and Hirsch (1999) . It is being stated for comparison to the convergence result in the next section. 
occurs with zero probability.
Enabling convergence to nash equilibrium
We will show that the introduction of a tracking forecast can enable, in some games, convergence to Nash equilibrium. We first introduce a modified tracking forecast that will greatly simplify the analysis.
Modified tracking forecast:
For the outcome sequence, x(k), the modified tracking forecast is defined as
for some fixed λ 1. It can happen that the modified tracking forecast, f (k), will lie outside of the simplex, but this does not affect the following discussion.
The form of the modified tracking forecast serves to mimic the effect of the step size in computing the original tracking forecast as compared to the step size in computing an empirical frequency. For any ρ < 1,
The modified tracking forecast reflects this ratio by using λ 1. Indeed, it is possible to show that the modified tracking forecast is weakly ε-calibrated for bounded rate sequences for ε ≈ 1/λ.
We now introduce another modification of smooth fictitious play that combines smooth fictitious play with tracking forecasts and standard smooth fictitious play (with empirical frequencies).
Smooth fictitious play with combined forecasts:
for some 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and λ 1. In words, each player uses a smoothed best response to a convex combination of the empirical frequencies and tracking forecasts. For γ = 0, this is standard smooth fictitious play, and for γ = 1, this is smooth fictitious play with (modified) tracking forecasts. Condition 1 in Theorem 4.2 implies that the linearization of smooth fictitious play is asymptotically stable (compare to Proposition 4.1). In this case, convergence of empirical frequencies to the Nash equilibrium in smooth fictitious play with combined forecasts is still possible for any mixture 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
More important is Condition 2. This implies that, under certain conditions, smooth fictitious play with combined forecasts can converge to Nash equilibrium in situations where standard smooth fictitious play does not.
Appendix B presents the proof of Theorem 4.2. The main idea is to show that the differential equations associated with smooth fictitious play with combined forecasts in (24) closely resemble (for large λ) the differential equations for so-called "derivative action fictitious play" in Arslan and Shamma (2004) , and Shamma and Arslan (2003) . The hypotheses of Theorem 4.2 imply local asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium for the derivative action fictitious play differential equations. Because of the close resemblance, the Nash equilibrium of smooth fictitious play with combined forecasts also will be locally asymptotically stable. 7 We can then invoke Theorem 5.4 of Benaim and Hirsch (1999) to conclude convergence to Nash equilibrium with positive probability.
Numerical simulations
In this section we present some experiments with simple toy examples. We will consider the Shapley game that was introduced in Shapley (1964) as an example to the cycles in (non-smooth) fictitious play. The game is defined by the utility matrices
The unique Nash equilibrium is
All of the simulations below use a smoothed best response with τ = 0.05. The tracking forecasts exponent is ρ = 0.6.
Smooth fictitious play:
Both players use smooth fictitious play (18). Figure 3 shows the empirical frequency history. The figure illustrates the well known oscillations associated with the Shapley game. The average rewards for each player is approximately (1/2, 1/2). Note that the average rewards associated with the Nash equilibrium are (1/3, 1/3). So although the behavior is oscillatory, the average is greater. Tracking forecasts vs. Empirical frequencies: Player P 1 uses smooth fictitious play with tracking forecasts (19) while Player P 2 uses smooth fictitious play with empirical frequencies (18). In terms of Theorem 4.1, player P 2 is "slower", and so player P 1 asymptotically plays the best response to player P 2 's stage-by-stage strategy. Figure 4 shows the history of empirical frequencies. It turns out that these converge to the Nash equilibrium. In fact, the governing differential equation for the empirical frequencies is q . 1 (t) = −q 1 (t) + β 1 (β 2 (q 1 (t))), q . 2 (t) = −q 2 (t) + β 2 (q 1 (t)).
These equations were studied in Leslie and Collins (2003) where players adapt at different time-scales. The difference here is that in the present paper, both players learn at the same rate, but one player has a superior forecast. As expected, the average rewards to each player approach (1/3, 1/3), which is lower than the oscillatory case of Fig. 3 .
Tracking forecasts: Both players use smooth fictitious play with tracking forecasts (19). Note that the strategy updates mimic standard smooth fictitious play, but at the forecast level:
The tracking forecasts exhibit the same oscillations observed before, while the empirical frequencies average these oscillations. Figure 5 shows a close-up of both the empirical frequencies and tracking forecasts. Once again, the average rewards are (1/2, 1/2).
While the averaging effect of the empirical frequencies is expected, the convergence to the Nash equilibrium values turns out to be a consequence of a symmetry in the Shapley game and is coincidental. Figure 6 shows behavior for a modified Shapley game, where M 1 is changed to
The tracking forecasts exhibit the oscillations that would be seen in standard smooth fictitious play, but at a faster timescale. Once again, the empirical frequencies flatten out to the average behavior of the oscillatory tracking forecasts. However, the asymptotic values no longer not coincide with a Nash equilibrium. Combined forecast: Both players use smooth fictitious play with combined forecasts (24) with γ = 0.1. The Jacobian matrix for the Shapley game satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.2. Figure 7 shows that the empirical frequencies converge to the Nash equilibrium. The average rewards approach (1/3, 1/3). Note that while the analysis of Theorem 4.2 was for the modified tracking forecast (23), the simulations use the original tracking forecast (6).
Concluding remarks
The proposed tracking forecast offers a tradeoff between universality and efficiency. On the one hand, it is an online algorithm which is easy to implement. On the other hand, it is calibrated with respect to a non-trivial class of sequences. When playing a repeated game, it enables convergence to a Nash equilibrium in a wider range of games than the range of games for which the smooth fictitious play converges. The simplicity of the framework suggests possible extensions to more complicated decision setups, like multi-stage competitive decision problems and perhaps even stochastic games (Filar & Vrieze, 1996) .
The resulting algorithm is not weakly calibrated against any source as demonstrated in Section 3.5. It is an open question if there is an efficient forecasting algorithm which is weakly calibrated against all sources (complexity here is in the sense of Blum et al. (1996) ). A promising approach in that respect is online convex programming (Zinkevich, 2003) where one tries to track the best solution to a combination of convex functions. The algorithm of Zinkevich (2003) is simple and efficient, however it is not clear if it is possible to construct an -calibrated scheme based on online convex programming that would not have increasing complexity with respect to . 8 The proof technique used in this paper are based on analysis of stochastic approximation type algorithms. It should be possible to provide convergence rate results using existing results for convergence rates for standard stochastic approximation (Borkar & Meyn, 2000; Kushner & Yin, 1997) and for two time scale stochastic approximation (Konda & Tsitsiklis, 2004) . Another important issue concerns characterizing the complexity/universality tradeoff. That is, determining the amount of memory requirements that are necessarily required by a universally calibrated scheme. Equation (25) is sometimes referred to as the Kushner-Clark condition (e.g, (Wang, Chong, & Kulkarni, 1996) ). Typical sufficient conditions (Benaim, 1999) for (25) are that the M(k) are random variables such that:
These are sufficient conditions for the Kushner-Clark to be satisfied almost surely. It is not always necessary to impose a random structure to assure these conditions. The following lemma will be useful in this regard. 
The lemma follows from the assumptions on α(k) and β(k).
Note that α(k) = 1/(k + 1) ρ satisfies the assumptions of Lemma A.1 for any 0 < ρ. Indeed, in that case α(k) − α(k + 1) ≤ ρk −(ρ+1) by the convexity of the function x −ρ .
Proposition A.2 (Two time scale stochastic approximation, (Borkar, 1997) ). Consider random sequences, X (k) and Y (k), generated by 
B. Proof of Theorem 4.2
We require a more specialized result from the ODE method of stochastic approximation. Propositions A.1-A.2 provide conditions for almost sure convergence based on the global asymptotic stability of the resulting differential equations. If an equilibrium point is only locally asymptotically stable, then one can conclude that convergence to equilibrium occurs with strictly positive probability (see Theorem 5.4 of Benaim & Hirsch (1999) ).
The relevant differential equations for smooth fictitious play with combined forecasts (24) are
The change of variables z i = f i − q i results in
We can compare these differential equations to those of "derivative action fictitious play". From the analysis of "derivative action fictitious play" in Shamma and Arslan (2005) , the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2 assure that the dynamics q .
i (t) = −q i (t) + β i (q −i (t) + γ λ(q −i (t) − r −i (t))) r .
i (t) = λ(q i (t) − r i (t)) are locally asymptotically stable at the Nash equilibrium (q * 1 , q * 2 ). For these dynamics, the change of variables
We will exploit the similarity between (26) and (27) to show that local asymptotic stability of (27) implies local asymptotic stability of (26).
The relevant (reduced order) Jacobian matrix for (27) can be written as
and N is defined in (21). From Theorem 3.5 in Shamma and Arslan (2005) , this matrix is stable (i.e., has negative real parts) for all sufficiently large λ as long as γ satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2. Now let us inspect the Jacobian matrix of (26), which can be written as
An eigenvector/eigenvalue pair (( For λ sufficiently large, γ will lie in the open interval specified by Theorem 4.2. A comparison to (28) implies that the eigenvalue, μ, must have a negative real part for λ sufficiently large.
